Abstract The Academic Labor Market in France can be viewed as a constrained Stable Marriage problem, pairing universities and candidates according to their (elitist) preferences. A Multi-Agent based model, calibrated after the empirical evidence, is used to investigate how universities can recruit the best candidates with high confidence. Extensive simulations suggest that universities can be divided in four categories: top and medium universities have no difficulty in attracting the candidates they have selected, contrarily to good and bad universities. In this paper, a learning mechanism is presented: universities are allowed to tune their expectations depending on whether they did succeed to attract candidates in the previous recruitment rounds. The impact of over/under estimations is analyzed with respect to the hiring efficiency and quality.
Introduction
National academic labor markets (ALMs) are strongly influenced by the culture and history of the country [1] . The French system examined in this paper reflects an egalitarian tradition; the hiring process globally aggregates the preferences of universities and candidates using a Stable Marriage-like algorithm [2] . Due to administrative constraints (limited size of the short list), this centralized procedure might entail some hiring inefficiencies, where good universities might select top candidates, who will ultimately prefer better universities. Universities might therefore use less elitist and more secure recruitment strategies. The goal of this paper is to examine how strategies based on raising/lowering the university expectations might improve their hiring efficiency. In an earlier study of the French ALM [3] , a MultiAgent (MA) simulation framework has been proposed to assess the hiring rate and the quality of the recruitment process. In this paper, this framework is extended, al-LRI, Universite Paris Sud, F-91405 Orsay France caillou;sebag@lri.fr lowing universities to adjust their selectivity depending on their hiring success in the previous steps. The efficiency of the considered strategies is discussed with respect to the university position (relatively to the set of universities).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews and discusses relevant work. The French academic labor market (ALM) is presented in section 3. Section 4 describes the MA-based model. Section 5 discusses the lessons learned from extensive simulations conducted with this model, and the paper concludes with some perspectives for further research.
Related work
Centralized (labor) markets are based on the preferences of sellers (here, the candidates) and buyers (the universities). The combinatorial optimization problem of building an optimal pairing, referred to as Stable Marriage problem, has been extensively investigated since Gale & Shapley pioneering work [2] . The French ministry actually uses a variant of the Stable Marriage algorithm (akin [4] ) to compute an optimal assignment of candidates to universities. Importantly, the procedure is shown to be truthful, in the sense that no agent could improve its outcome by lying about its preferences [5] . The optimality and truthfulness properties however only hold in an idealized setting (rational agents, unbounded shortlists).
The French academic labor market has more specifically been studied by [1] in a sociological perspective. This work focuses on organizational, societal and cognitive aspects; the professional efficiency, the university organization and department cohesiveness, and the quality assessment are related to the hiring process. The Local Hiring phenomenon has been investigated in a specific area by [6] , empirically measuring how the proximity between the PhD jury of a candidate and the jury of highly competitive national examinations, is correlated with the probability of success of the candidate.
On the computational side, a variety of social and economical problems have been investigated using multi-agent systems (MAs) [7, 8] . MAs have demonstrated their ability to both represent (cognitive) agents and constrained interaction rules, and provide insights into the dynamics of the system. More generally, MAs are increasingly being considered as a flexible and versatile modelling framework, enabling positive and normative investigations of phenomena out of reach of analytical studies, and supported by efficient programming environments (e.g., ModulEco [9] and RePast [10] ). In an earlier work [3] , a MAS has been proposed to model the French ALM and study the local hiring problem; interestingly, local hiring (see below) was shown to be an efficient hiring strategy (as opposed to, a "bad university habit") in some settings.
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This section describes the French academic hiring process and the available ground truth.
The hiring process
• The list of all open positions in all universities is published by the State department. Every PhD 1 is free to apply to any such position; the number of applications is not restricted.
• In each university, for each position, a jury is designated, selects candidates and interviews the selected candidates.
• Every selected candidate goes to every interview (except for conflicting schedules or if he has been formerly top-listed in a University he prefers).
• For each position, the jury publishes a shortlist of at most five names, selected among the interviewed candidates.
• Each candidate is informed of the positions he has been shortlisted for, together with his rank; he symmetrically ranks all positions (no length constraint) according to his preferences.
• All university shortlists and candidate ranking lists are sent to the ministry; a stable marriage like algorithm is used to compute the actual matching.
Empirical Evidence
In 2007, the number of open positions, the number of candidates and the number of applications in every discipline were published by the State department (Table  1) . Three main categories were distinguished. In the first category, including Law, Economics & Management (L&M) disciplines, each candidate applies on average to 50% of the opened positions. In the other categories, including Science on the one hand and Literature and Humanities on the other hand (H&S), the number of candidates per position (pressure) is significantly higher and the number of applications per candidate is significantly lesser. Globally, the hiring process is efficient in the sense that the recruitment rate is 98%. The local hiring rate, that is the percentage of universities recruiting candidates who passed their PhD in this same university, is circa 28% (37% in L&M, 24% in Humanities and 28% in Science). 
Academic Labor Market Modelling
This section describes the Multi-Agent model proposed for the French academic labor market, together with the assumptions made regarding university and candidate preferences.
Agent Preferences
It might be safely assumed that universities aim at recruiting the best candidates while candidates aim at being recruited in the best universities. Usually each agent has however different quality criteria; and, would it exist, the "true quality" ordering is unknown.
The proposed modelling will thus proceed in a backward manner, assuming that there exists such a "true ordering", of which each agent preference ordering is a perturbed variant. Only two types of perturbations are considered at the moment, respectively based on locality preferences and on random noise (see below).
Formally, letting U denote the number of universities, it is assumed with no loss of generality that the set of universities {u 1 , . . . , u U } is ordered according to the "true ordering". Symmetrically, C denotes the number of candidates and {c 1 , . . . c C } the set of candidates ordered after the "true ordering".
Multi-Agent based Model
The MAS involves two types of agents, candidates {c 1 , . . . , c C } and universities {u 1 , . . . , u U }, where an agent index stands for its rank after the (unknown) "true ordering". Furthermore the model is spatialized, that is, to each agent are associated 2D coordinates (in [0, 1]). The home University of an candidate is the nearest one after the Euclidean distance.
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Candidates
Candidate c i is characterized from five parameters. The first two parameters (in [0, 1]) govern his preference ordering: i) elitism e i stands for his bias toward the best universities; ii) locality i stands for his bias toward the nearest universities. A random perturbation, modelled as (1 − e i − i )V with V uniformly drawn in [0, 1], accounts for his subjective preferences. Overall, the quality q(i,t) of university u t for candidate c i is computed as (the lower the better):
Three more parameters are used to model the application strategy of candidate c i . A risk-propensity parameter r i determines whether he rather applies to the top-ranked universities (according to the preference ordering q(i, ·)), or to the universities best matching his own rank. Precisely, the strategic ordering of c i is defined as (the lower the better):
|i − t| C His application strategy is finally defined from the number N i of positions he will apply to; c i applies to the top N i universities after the ordering s(i,t). Independently, c i applies to his home University with probability h i (empirically, candidates always apply to their home university).
Universities
Likewise, university u t is characterized from four parameters. The first two parameters (in [0, 1]) govern his preference ordering: i) elitism e t stands for its bias toward the best candidates; ii) locality t stands for its bias toward local candidates. Lastly, a random perturbation modeled as (1 − e t )V with V uniformly drawn in [0, 1], accounts for the "subjective" preferences of university u t . Overall, the quality r(i,t) of candidate c i for university u t is:
where δ i,t is 1 iff c i is local to u t and 0 otherwise. University u t selects the candidates to be interviewed after its risk propensity r t and a SelfAssessment parameter o t , where o t is positive (respectively negative) if university u t tends to consider itself less attractive (respectively more attractive) than it is after the "true" university ordering. More precisely, its strategic ordering is defined as:
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Two settings, referred to as NoLearning and Learning, are distinguished in the following. In the NoLearning setting, o t is set to 0. In the Learning setting, o t is adjusted after each "move" (yearly recruitment). In the case the university did not recruit its candidate, it lowers its expectation and o t is incremented. Otherwise o t is decremented with probability α, where α is computed after the empirical hiring rate 2 ). s
Interaction rules
Every candidate c i applies for the top N i positions after ordering s(i, ·), where N i is uniformly selected in [1, Max.Application], and he applies to his home university with probability h i .
Every university u t produces a shortlist of 5 names, the top 5 candidates after ordering s (·,t) 3 .
Every candidate c i thereafter ranks the universities having shortlisted him after the q(i, ·) ordering. Eventually, the candidates and universities preferences are aggregated by a variant of Stable Marriage algorithm [4] , an optimal matching is derived, and the recruitment decisions are made accordingly.
Simulation Results

Methodology and Experimental settings
The main two efficiency indicators of an ALM are the HiringRate (fraction of positions fulfilled) and the LocalHiring rate (fraction of positions fulfilled by local candidates). We further consider the FameLoss of each university, defined as the difference between the rank of the recruited candidate and its own rank (not fulfilled positions are not considered).
The key parameters of the MA-based model (number of positions, of candidates and maximal number of applications per candidate, size of the shortlist) are calibrated after the empirical evidence presented for the H&S disciplines 4 (section 4). The behavioral parameters (elitism, localism, risk-propensity) are set to the so- (Table 2) , studied and validated in [3] . The simulations were performed using the RePast Framework [10] . All reported results are averaged over 1,000 independent simulations with same parameter setting. 
No learning setting
In the NoLearning case (o t = 0), the results closely match the available ground truth: HiringRate rate is 97% (vs 94% in empirical data) and Local Hiring rate is 28% (vs 28%). Interestingly, the HiringRate and the average number of received applications do not vary linearly w.r.t. the university rank. More precisely, four categories of universities can be distinguished ( Fig. 1 ):
• The Best (Top 8 universities) have a high HiringRate and receive many applications. The Best universities choose the best candidates, who come. The LocalHiring rate is the lowest one (Fig. 2 ).
• The Good (rank between 9 and 21) have a low HiringRate although they receive a high number of applications. These universities, in the shadow of the Best ones, particularly suffer from the limited size of the short list to select the best candidates. While many good candidates apply to the Good universities, if they are selected they seldom come; they go to the Best universities.
• The Medium (between 22 and 39) have a high HiringRate, despite the fact that they receive few applications. They interview good risk-adverse candidates and local candidates. The short-listed candidates (including local candidates) come, as the Medium universities is the best they can pretend to. Both HiringRate and LocalHiring rate are high.
• The Bad (between 40 and 50) also receive few applications; they have a low HiringRate and a very high LocalHiring rate. Like Medium universities, they interview good risk-adverse and local candidates; however their top-listed candidates are more likely to defect if they can, and the HiringRate therefore decreases.
With respect to the FameLoss criteria, Fig 3 shows two groups of universities with significantly different behaviors: Best and Good universities recruit the best candidates they can attract whereas Medium and Bad universities recruit candidates with a disappointingly low rank. Furthermore, the FameLoss increases with the risk propensity (Fig. 3) . This unexpected phenomena is blamed on the "subjectivity" effect involved in the preference r(·,t). The more risk-taker the university, the more it follows its own preference ranking, possibly selecting candidates with low rank due to subjective or local preferences.
Learning Universities Setting
In the Learning case, universities are allowed to increase/decrease their SelfAssessment depending on the success of the past hiring rounds. The results (averaged over 1000 independent runs) are measured after stabilization (1000 time steps). As could have been expected, learning makes universities more efficient: the HiringRate increases compared to the NoLearning case (Fig. 1) . The SelfAssessment curve (Fig. 4) displays contrasted situations, mirroring the HiringRate curve ( Fig. 1 -NoLearning  case) . Roughly speaking, the Best universities tend to overestimate themselves, the Good ones, to depreciate themselves (in order to anticipate the defection of their candidates), the Medium ones seemingly have no bias, and the Bad ones underestimate themselves.
The impact of the risk propensity is analyzed wrt the FameLoss, as the HiringRate does not discriminate among good and bad universities in the Learning case. Fig. 5 suggests that the risk propensity has no impact on the FameLoss except for the Best universities, that should rather have a conservative strategy (low risk propensity).
In the meanwhile, the SelfAssessment parameter features a high impact on the FameLoss (Fig. 6) . If Best universities overestimate themselves, the weight of their subjective preferences increases, which results in recruiting lower-ranked candidates everything else being equal. Inversely, Good universities should not deprecate themselves in order to minimize the Fame loss. Quite the contrary, the Medium and Bad universities optimize their FameLoss by underestimating themselves.
Conclusion
This paper, resuming an earlier work devoted to the inefficiencies of Centralized Academic Labor Market [3] , investigates how universities can increase their hiring rate. The proposed mechanism, relying on the self evaluation of the universities expectations, duly addresses the market inefficiencies regarding the Hiring rate. Extensive empirical investigations however suggest that this way of increasing the hiring rate can entail some undesirable Fame Loss. Specifically, Best and Good universities should not underestimate (respectively overestimate) themselves in order to recruit best or good candidates. Quite the contrary, Medium and Bad universities should deliberately underestimate themselves to secure the recruitment of acceptable candidates.
Further research will consider more comprehensive learning/optimizing setting for universities and candidates, allowing them to fine tune their behavioral parameters in order to maximize their consolidated Fame for universities, and their job quality for candidates. 
